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10 Asylum in a Different Voice:
Judging Immigration Claims and Gender

Carrie Menkel~Meadow!

Perhaps the most interesting result of our cross-tabulation study was that the
gender of the judge had a significant impact on the likelihood that asylum would
be granted. Female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate of 53%, while male
judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.3%. An asylum applicant assigned by chance
to a female judge therefore had a 44% better chance of prevailing than an applicant
assigned to a male judge!

A. Introduction: Gender Difference in Theory and Practice
The extraordinary (and quite robust) findings of Professors Ran~ji~Nogales,
Schoenholtz, and Schrag that gender matters in the outcomes of claims for asy~
lum is not as surprising as it might seem (at least to some of us!). The idea that
women judges and lawyers might behave differently &om men has been debated
in legal scholarship for several decades. The current study provides some of the
most powerful and interesting evidence that such a claim about gender in judging
in some contexts is valid. What we ought to do about this result as a policy mat~
ter remains a quite complicated and debatable issue.
As I will suggest in this essay, women may not only arrive at different outcomes in some kinds of cases, but they are likely to "reason" differently, or consider
different facts, circumstances, and conditions as they consider what to decide in
granting asylum or not (and perhaps in judging other matters, as well, including
those beyond the scope of the present study). I will argue that women should
not be the only repositors of those values, attitudes, or considerations that lead
them to grant asylum more readily. What women do "differently" should perhaps
be more the norm, so that denials, not grants, of asylum status would be more
the outliers and departures from justice, or that, at least, a deeper contextual,
relational, empathic credibility assessment and factual analysis of asylum cases
might be appropriate, rather than the current set of assumptions, presumptions,
and evidentiary considerations that seem to lead to arbitrary, or at least inconsistent' asylum denials. 3 To the extent that women judges may be more likely to
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preside over "conversational" or empathetic hearing processes, they may encour~
age fuller narratives from troubled asylum claimants. That women judges actually
do behave differently in more formal court settings still needs empirical verifica~
tion. Differences in judicial behavior may vary depending on the setting (formal
or informal) and the nature of the claim (and legal rules and evidence rules that
govern the proceedings).
Twenty~five years ago, in a book that ruptured the arguments of "equality"
feminist theorists and activists in law4 and elsewhere, Carol Gilligan suggested
that girls (and women) might engage in "different" patterns of moral reasoning
and decision making. Her path~altering book, In A Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Womens Development (1982), argued that girls were more concerned
about "connection and relationships" than they were about solving algebraic ques~
tions ofjustice that forced them to solve problems by choosing one legal right (or
one person) over another.
In her empirical studies of how adolescents made decisions about such mat~
ters as whether to have an abortion or resist the military, she noticed a pattern
of difference, not always in actual decisions but frequently in modes of decision
making and rationales used for particular choices. Gilligan used a hypothetical of
moral reasoning (originally developed by her graduate~school colleague, friend,
and noted psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg)5 to ask young people how they would
reason to achieve justice. The hypothetical or moral fable was known as Heinz's
Dilemma. It asked whether Heinz, whose wife was suffering from a terminal and
painful disease, would be morally wrong in stealing a drug to ease suffering, and,
perhaps, prolong the life of his wife, from a pharmacist who was charging a price
for the drug that was beyond Heinz's means to pay. Carol Gilligan queried young
boys and girls about what they thought about Heinz's choices.
In her book Gilligan reported on two "typical" responses she received that
marked different narratives of moral reasoning. Jake, consistent with many of the
subjects of Kohlberg's (mostly, if not exclusively male) subjects, used universalis~
tic, legalistic, and "algebraic" reasoning. The drug belonged to the pharmacist-it
was his property. Stealing property is both morally wrong and against the law,
unless there is a more important right that trumps the right of property. Jake rea~
soned, by "balancing rights," that since life was "worth" more than property, it was
morally permissible for Heinz to steal the drug. Thus, Jake solved the "equation"
of justice by declaring that Heinz was entitled to steal the drug because his was
the "superior" and therefore morally"trumping" right.6
Amy, on the other hand, engaged in a different sort of reasoning, what I then
described as "like a bad law student, fighting the hypo:'7 Amy tried to see the
needs, rights, and interests of all the parties. Perhaps, she suggested, Heinz and
the druggist could sit down and talk about the problem. They might arrange an
203

Asylum in a Different Voice?

installment payment plan for the drug, thus holding constant the needs of Hei~
nis wife for the drug and the pharmacist's need to make a living. Maybe they
should ask Heinz's wife (who is most affected by the decisions made) what she
thinks should be done. For Amy the dilemma involved more people and had a
wider and deeper context than a simple"yes or no:'
On Kohlberg's scale of "universal" moral development, Amy scores lower than
Jake because she equivocates, she focuses on the facts and personalistic aspects of
the problem, and she does not adequately address the larger "universal" issues of
justice, precedent, and the need to rank 'Clear" hierarchical moral choices.
Soon after Gilligan's book was published and a torrent of controversy was
unleashed among feminists, lawyers, sociologists, psychologists, biologists, and
anthropologists about whether men and women were more alike or more differ~
ent in their attitudes, beliefs, and actions, I wrote an article provocatively titled,
"Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process;'8
in which I argued that Gilligan's work, joined by the work of other scholars of
human behavior at that time,9 supported a notion that women might engage in
"different" forms of legal reasoning, valuing highly human connection, relation~
ships, not just rules, and especially the contexts in which legal and moral prob~
lems were situated.
Portia was chosen (both by me and by Carol Gilligan) as an evocative figure
because she pleaded for mercy (not just cool justice) in Shakespeare's Merchant of
Venice. to Portia's plea for mercy facilitated the expansion of Carol Gilligan's origi~
nal notion of "an ethic of care" to a wide variety of political and legal contexts. 1I
While Jake displayed an "ethic of justice" of rights balancing and clear choices,
Amy tried to keep the connections of parties in conflict in relationship to each
other and to herself and worried a lot about everyone's (not just the legal win~
ner's) well~being. Amy became a symbol of legal actors and scholars who saw
care, human flourishing, and so~called positive rights as an equally, if not more,
important part of the justice system than "negative" rights of freedom from (gov~
ern mental restraint)!' The kind of "care for the other" that Amy and Portia came
to represent in this highly contested literature may hold some of the explanatory
clues to the Ramji~Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag findings of gender differ~
ences in asylum decisions (what I will from here on call "the gender judging find~
ings").
Twenty~five years ago, I also argued that women were (more) likely to use dif~
ferent sorts of processes and modes in their legal and moral reasoning than rela~
tively "simple;' blunt~cut determinations made according to formal, bright~line
legal rules. This argument included not only more contextual and relational rea~
soning (suggesting more mediational and negotiated, rather than decisional, pro~
cesses) but also different outcomes (more "shared;' contingent, or jointly managed
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solutions to problems, both moral and legal). In the asylum context these claims
would suggest that women judges might be more likely to facilitate less formal
conversations in the hearing process, be less rigid with respect to evidentiary
admissibility rulings, cabin or control extraordinarily harsh cross~examinations,
and empathize with claimants. On the other hand, since the asylum decision is a
binary one-yes or no-there is little room in this environment for "compromise"
or intermediate rulings.
I went on to speculate (as the article's title honestly announced) on a variety of
other gender differences that might playa role in the legal system, including more
inclusive forms of evidence rules (what is "admissible" or "relevant" might vary
more in different legal contexts), less draconian decision making, both in rules
and outcomes, a generally less adversarial approach. to both process (more open,
inclusive, and conversational or "dialogic") and outcomes (avoidance of binary
outcomes), participation by more parties affected by legal decision making, and,
most relevant to the present inquiry, different modes and outcomes of'Judging:'13
Immediately following these claims, several things happened. First, some other
legal analysts joined or expanded the argument, suggesting that women would
reason in a different voice, change the legal rules and legal processes, practice law
differently, treat their clients and opponents differently, use different qualities of
'Judgment" in deciding cases, or otherwise transform the legal system.'4 Second, a
few legal scholars applied these theories specifically to the acts ofjudging. IS Third,
at both theoretical levels, and ultimately in a wide variety of empirical studies,
scholars from many different fields argued about the validity of these claims and
the alleged "sources" of gender difference (whether in biology, socialization, or
political oppression and subordination).'6
I will review some of those claims and empirical findings here, but it is also
true that the issue of "gender difference" in legal work has more recently receded
to a more quiescent period of simply documenting numbers of participants in
the legal and judicial professions, without much speculation about or evidence to
confirm gender differences in the structure or performance of legal and judicial
work!' The findings of the Refugee Roulette study 8 change all that, and we are
back to speculating on what it all means.
In this essay I will first provide some review of what we already know about
gender differences in legal and judicial behavior, and then I will recap what Ramji~
Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag have uncovered about gender differences in
decisions about whether to grant asylum in the immigration context. Finally, t
will take up once again some speculations about what it all means, including why
those differences in asylum grant rates exist, and offer some further thoughts
about the policy implications of the present findings. I say "speculation" because
although the data are clear and robust here, the present study does not include
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qualitative data or interviews with the decision makers to test any of the hypoth~
eses or speculations I (or Ramji~ Nogales, Schoenholtz, or Schrag) offer here.
Clearly, more empirical work is required. For example, to the extent that future
researchers could get access to study hearings, they could code for differences in
process behaviors and rulings. Simple interview studies could also at least let the
judges speak for themselves about what they think they do in judging claims so
that at least at the self~reporting level we could see if there are gender differences
in beliefs about or conceptions of what judges are doing.

B. Empirical Findings on Gender Differences in
Legal Decision Making
For decades political scientists have been studying the correlations of a variety
of demographic and political factors with particular judicial outcomes. In short
(more detail provided below), the results are quite mixed and, I would say, incon~
elusive, with many researchers proclaiming that there is little to no support for
the elaim that women judges behave differently than men judges. 19 In addition to
the empirical data, there is the claim, often made, that judging, by role definition,
demands neutrality and so women don their judicial robes and roles to literally
"disembody" themselves and assimilate to a "neutral" or male model of judging so
as to draw the least amount of attention to their biological or 'embodied" gen~
der!O Judging is, after all, about being "neutral;' "impartial;' and unbiased, not let~
ting personal characteristics or relationships interfere in any way with decision
making. Consider the image of" Lady Justice" (yes, a woman representingjustice)
who is blindfolded so she weighs her scales of justice without "seeing" who the
parties before her really are. 21 Both the judge and the parties are "disembodied;'
representing only their legal claims and not their personhood.
On the other hand, there is a growing body of empirical work that does find
some gender differences in judicial behavior,21 noting that among other things,
women judges may be more likely to find discrimination in employment (by both
race and gender),>3 that women are both more and less harsh in criminal sen~
tencing, 14 including in cases where criminal offenders have done great harm to
women, as in rape or sexual assault cases,>' but are also sometimes "harsher" on
women in family law cases. 26 An early study found that women were more sym ~
pathetic to those seeking to avoid the draft,27 supporting theoretical arguments
that because women are mothers they are more inclined to disfavor war and mili~
tary solutions and more likely to seek "peace" in a variety of different contexts!S
Other studies have found that women were more likely to vote with claimants
and mothers (in criminal~justice and family~law settings), while male judges were
more likely to protect individual interests of accused persons!9 In another study,
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women judges on state courts were more likely to vote "liberally" on obscenity
and death penalty issues. In such cases just the presence of one woman on a state
supreme court could increase the probability that the rest of the court would fol~
Iowa more "liberal" position.3D
Clearly, there is 'conflict in the circuits" (and trial courts and appellate courts)
and in the data on the issues of whether there are gender differences in judging
and, if there are, in what direction they operate ("protectionist" of same~gender
interests as in family and discrimination matters, or harsher for differential expec~
tations of different genders, especially in criminal and family law matters).
As I will discuss more fully below, these complex, and sometimes contradic~
tory, empirical findings on gender differences in judging track the contradictory
and inconclusive literature on whether there are gender differences in legal prac~
tice generally.3) There is empirical work that supports claims that women perform
certain lawyering tasks differently,3> or are more "ethical;'33 or have different goals
with respect to the purposes of their legal work, such as being more oriented to
public interest workr and other studies that claim that no significant differences
in practice protocols can be observed. 35 For many years (indeed, one could say
for centuries), it was widely assumed that women would practice and interpret
law differently or at least disrupt the study of law, as is evidenced in the many
successful efforts to exclude women from law schools for most of human (and
American) history.3 6
There is fairly consistent research on the continuing occupational segrega~
tion of women in the profession, women being disproportionately represented
in the public sector and still not present in the upper reaches of the large corpo~
rate law firm partnership.37 As studies of gender difference in the practice of law
and judging continue, I suspect we may be in the middle of a generational shift.
The way women are recruited and socialized to the profession in times of scar~
city as opposed to tim~s of "critical mass"38 may determine the relative "freedom"
that women (or other "minorities" in the workplace) have to express particular
views, attitudes, or behaviors. Early gender~difference literature confirmed that
early recruits to a male~ (or white~) dominated profession were quite likely to
"conform" or assimilate to traditional patterns of behavior. As the more recent
studies of gender differences in judging are demonstrating, the numbers of find~
ings of difference seem to be increasing, perhaps signaling larger samples from
which to observe and study differences, as critical mass and representation of
women increases in both the judiciary and the practice of law generally.39 Since
there are a relatively large number of women judges in the immigration system
(32%), perhaps women judges in this system are within the "critical mass" range
and feel "freer" to rule and decide on their own terms and interpretations of the
law and facts. Or, it is also possible that since the immigration judiciary suffers
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from being less "public" and is less "prestigious" than other court settings, women
may feel "liberated" (without much scrutiny or because no one really"cares" about
what they do) to decide cases in ways they think are appropriate and just, with~
out needing to "conform" to a male "norm" of higher denial rates.
It is also quite important to observe that more recent studies of women as
judges are focusing on differences where there are "mixed panels" of judges, as in
various appellate courts, as opposed to the single trial judge making decisions on
her/his own. The present study looks at judges at the trial and some appellate
levels (Board of Immigration Appeals, circuit courts of appeals) but, due to lack
of adequate data, has not looked closely at differences in the gender composition
of multiple~judge panels. 40 A growing body of work on the paths of influence and
collegiality in multiperson judging situations suggests that mere representation
of women (or other nonmajority male judges) may alter the decisional processes
and outcomes.41

c. The "Gender Gap" in Asylum Judging
In addition to the primary finding of a wide gap in asylum grant rates for women
and male judges (53% rate of granting asylum for women, versus 37.3% for men,
making it 44% more likely for a claim to result in a grant of asylum when brought
before a woman immigration judge), other empirical findings of the present study
illuminate the power of"gender plus." When gender is combined with other vari~
ables, the 'gender gap" in judging rates may be even more profound. Prior employ~
ment settings and reactions to the presence of claimants' dependents and family
members are among the factors that interact with "simple" gender differences.
Paths to the traditional bench are quite different for women,41 as the find~
ings of difference in pre~judicial employment of immigration judges in this study
confirms. More women than men who ascend to the immigration bench work in
nongovernmental organizations (29% for women to 9% for men), but, in contrast,
many more men than women come &om governmental enforcement agencies like
the Department of Homeland Security or the previously named Immigration
and Naturalization Service (56% of men compared to 51% for women). Men were
more likely to come from governmental enforcement agencies potentially more
sympathetic to enforcement and exclusionary practices and policies than women,
who worked in settings more "sympathetic" to asylum seekers, including both gov~
ernment and private practice. On the trial bench generally women are more likely
to come &om government, legal education, and other public services than are
male judges, who disproportionately come &om large law firms and prosecutorial
roles. Thus, differences in judicial behavior may simply be a further reflection of
earlier gender differentiation in opportunities for socialization in different work
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environments. Whether women 'choose" or are "pulled" toward public service or
are "pushed" toward it through exclusion from other work environments remains
a much~studied question in occupational segregation and socialization studies. 43
Prior work experience clearly affects grant of asylum rates (according to the
gender judging data here). Those with prior government service granted asylum
in 39.6% of cases compared to 47.1% of those from NGOs or private practice,
with prior DHS and INS experience explaining much of the variance (those
without DHS and INS experience granted asylum 48.2% of the time, compared
to 38.9% of those with DHS/INS experience). Judges with experience in academia, private law practice, and NGOs were all more likely to grant asylum than
those with DHS/INS experience. A few female judges, who are beginning to
write about their experiences as judges, have reported that their experiences as
women jurists qua women, including both work and family roles (as mothers,
academics, reformists, particular kinds of lawyers, such as family lawyers), and
their needs to be sympathetic to differences, do and will affect how they perform
as judges.44 Thus, Baroness Hale, the highest judge in the United Kingdom, for
example, has been studied as one who has used her experience in family law and
as an academic to understand and write differently about some women's issues,
such as family (dis)connections and appropriate clothing for Muslims in public schools. Female immigration judges may understand from inside experience
(through personal or professional and representational experience) some of the
particularities of women's asylum claims (such as those that are explicitly gen~
dered, such as domestic violence or cultural practices like female circumcision).
Nevertheless, the gender judging findings here found a strong gender difference in asylum grant rates, independent of prior work experience, demonstrat~
ingjust how profound and robust the 'gender gap" findings in asylum grant rates
are here. As the data demonstrate, female judges still have higher asylum grant
rates regardless of work location. Gender differences in asylum grant rates persist
and indeed get stronger when gender is combined with other variables such as
whether applicants were represented by counsel (female judges granted asylum
in 55.6% of cases with representation while male judges granted asylum in only
14.3% of cases where the applicants were unrepresented).
One additional finding of this study is relevant to the issue of gender differ~
ences in judging. Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag found that
the presence of dependents (usually children, but sometimes also spouses) also
dramatically increased the likelihood of a grant of asylum. Those with no dependents had a 42.3% grant rate, whereas having one dependent increased that rate
to 48.2%, a statistically significant difference. The existence of these family mem~
bers may mark both increased credibility and increased sympathy for the claimant. Knowing that by denying the claim a judge may be sending a whole family to
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their deaths or serious injury or to a parencless living situation may cause those
who "care" about family and child well-being to increase their likelihood of granting asylum. As I discuss more fully below, this "family" effect is consistent with
some of the theoretical claims made about what female judges may consider as
relevant and appropriate in deciding such cases.
Thus, despite somewhat equivocal findings about gender differences in previous studies of judicial behavior in courts, gender differences in judging asylum
cases noted in this study are quite pronounced.

D. What It Means: Why Are Women Judges
More Likely to Grant Asylumr
The dramatic findings of this study demonstrating that women immigration
judges are 44% more likely to grant asylum than male judges revitalizes the
debates of gender differences in judging and legal behavior of the last few decades.
The current study has probably a bigger database of cases and judges than most,
if not all, of the prior studies of this phenomenon and so may provide a more
rigorous test of gender-difference claims. On the other hand, immigration cases,
and the asylum claim in particular, are located in a unique context, conjuring up
terrible harms and suffering if asylum is not granted, relying on relatively vague
legal standards, being very fact intensive in proof requirements, requiring a great
deal of discretion, and, at the same time, are overshadowed by highly contentious
immigration-policy concerns about how "open" to make our borders. Whether
the strength and robustness of the gender-gap findings here would be replicated
in other judicial settings is less clear. Consider, as one possible comparison, Social
Security disability claims. These are also claims that rely on testimony about levels of pain and suffering; there may also be a "critical mass" of female judges in this
system, but the legal regulations and definitions of disability are more delineated
and more rigid. Studies of other judicial settings would provide an interesting
test of the true extent of this 'gender gap" in judging behavior.
In trying to understand why there are gender differences in judging asylum
cases, it might be useful to revisit one of Carol Gilligan's other moral fables, a
more recent one that is remarkably close to the issues presented by asylum cases.
In her work on "the two moralities;' Gilligan posed the following problem to
young girls and boys:
Two industrious moles have worked all summer to build themselves a shelter for the
winter. When winter arrives, a less forward-looking porcupine pleads with the moles
to share their comfortable hole. In their concern, they take the porcupine into their
close and small space and then are hurt by the sharpness of the porcupine's quills.
What should the moles do?45
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In Gilligan's studies, adolescents with a "rights" or 'Justice" orientation (more
often, but not exclusively, boys) suggest that the porcupine should be thrown out
(or excluded from the comfortable hole) because the moles built the hole with
their hard labor and earned moral desert. Indeed, if the porcupine refuses to leave
"voluntarily;' many young boys in the study said it would be morally permissible
for the moles to shoot the porcupine. Sound familiar? Is this the brutal boundary
defense with a theory of border-based moral desert that our immigration policy
enacts? Why should those who have not participated in creating the American
polity be allowed to enter, just because, like the porcupine, they have a "need" to
get out of the cold (or more dangerous situations of persecution)?
Young girls in the study were much more likely to be sympathetic to the porcupine and looked for other ways to account for and satisfy the needs of both the
moles and the porcupine. They were more likely to develop solutions like using
a blanket to cover the porcupine, asking the porcupine to work with the moles
to enlarge the living space, or creating a separate space for the porcupine to use.
Those who responded by trying to find a solution for getting the porcupine out
of the cold are labeled those who reason with an "ethic of care:'
As studies using this fable have accumulated, data indicate that most men and
about one-third of all women use the first, "rights"-based approach to the moral
dilemma and about two-thirds of women and a smaller group of men use the latter approach. 46 In the first approach, like Jake's reasoning in the Heinz Dilemma,
reasoning is from abstract, rational, and universal principles-land, holes, housing, and property belong to those who work for them-moral desert based on
effort and boundaries. For those who seek to include the porcupine (even if
he didn't contribute, initially, to making the hole) values of human need, care,
connection, social responsibility, and sharing dominate concerns about efforts,
boundaries, and rights. If you don't like to see suffering of any other sentient
being, then it is hard to 'exclude" the needy.
The Porcupine's Dilemma of moral desert or human need aptly represents
some of the challenges faced by immigration judges, who, after all, have a statute
to interpret. What is a"well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" on
account of which a person outside of his country is "unable or owing to such fear,
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" and therefore should
be granted asylum as a refugee?47 Is the porcupine's fear of the cold within a qualifying category? How much suffering must he endure? Is he excluded because
his species/ race/ nationality of porcupine is disfavored by his native habitat and
"country" or by those who rule in his native land, or because he is different from
the moles? Judgments about how to characterize groups, categories, facts, and the
relationship of individual harm( s) within collective entities (e.g., social groups,
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religions, nationalities, political groups) require much discretion, as well as evi,
dence, and interpretation. Like the porcupine who pleads for "mercy" and empa,
thy, asylum applicants tell stories of suffering, fear, and serious physical harm.
Whether they are allowed to crawl into the safe "hole" may depend on whether
the deciding moles are male or female, whether they are considering rational and
abstract principles, and precedent, or simply human need.
Since there are no settled quotas on successful asylum applicants, individual
judges must determine in each individual case, with the aid of whatever prec,
edent exists from past decisions, BIA decisions, and the appellate cases from the
relevant circuit court of appeals, whether to let a particular candidate "in" or not.
The fact' dependent nature of these cases and their individuality makes it rela,
tively easy to treat each case almost sui generis. Thus, unlike many other settings
in which the effects of gender in judging have been studied, immigration cases
may provide an arena of greater discretion, greater fact specificity, and broader
relevance, and a site where particular stories of human need and suffering may,
at least for some decision makers, "trump" the more broad, vague, and abstract
legal standards. It would be useful to study more rigorously whether gender dif,
ferences in judging vary with respect to the confines or specifics of the law being
applied. For example, Rand and Dana Jack found in their studies of lawyers' ethi,
cal behavior that men and women acted or opined about ethical matters quite
similarly when the ethical rules were clear (e.g., applying confidentiality rules)
but were quite different when there was little specific direction or more discre,
tion in a particular rule interpretation (such as when to disclose information to
the other side in a contested matter).48
If Amy, Portia, and female moles reason with an "ethic of carenrather than an
'ethic of rules and justice;' then female immigration judges may be more likely to
listen to stories of human need and suffering with a more empathic, or sympa'
thetic, ear. If, as the data above show, women judges are more likely to be sym,
pathetic to (or rule in favor of) claimants in discrimination and family law cases,
perhaps the combination of persecution for ethnic, national, religious, or even
political affiliations, coupled with concerns about the harms visited upon pos,
sibly abandoned dependents, makes asylum claims more likely to be validated by
women judges.
To the extent that immigration cases combine intensive fact determinations
with a relatively vague and broad statutory standard, they are precisely the kind
of case in which appeals to need, emotional elements, and nonlegal factors may be
particularly salient. Thus, like the studies that demonstrate that men and women
do not differ much in their judging behavior unless gender itself is salient (as in
discrimination, family law, and a variety of other case types), immigration may
fall on the side of personal or human need (rather than commercial or other civil
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claims) that may be, in some cases, gendered. 49 Where determinations of cases
are more dependent on human considerations, both in terms of evidence (cred~
ibility, storytelling, degree of personal fear, suffering, and harm) and in terms of
directly observable outcomes (if asylum is not granted, the losing claimant is
automatically "removed" and may be detained, if not already in detention), the
tearing or breaking of human connections and lives may be salient by gender (in
a disproportionate number of, if not in all, cases). As Robin West has eloquently
argued, the law needs to take account of women's hedonic needs, including claims
(like relationship and familial [dis ] connection) that have previously been under~
protected in the law. so
In another context, I have reported on my own experience as a judge (arbi~
trator) in a gender~salient set of casesY For some years I was an arbitrator in
some of the thousands of hearings attended by victims of a mass tort, involving
a defective product, the birth control device Dalkon Shield, which caused inju~
ries ranging from death to infertility, unwanted pregnancies, excessive bleeding,
infections, and pain to exclusively female claimants.s2 The Dalkon Shield Claim~
ants Trust (which managed the arbitration hearings from inside the bankruptcy
proceedings of the manufacturer, the A.H. Robins Company, and was adminis~
tered by Duke University's Private Acljudication Center) initially sought to use as
decision makers labor arbitrators, who turned out to be more or less exclusively
male. I was recruited as the first woman, followed by many others, to begin to
hear these cases, as the program's managers realized that all the claimants were
women who were to testify about very intimate details of their lives. While both
I and other researchers had hoped to formally study this claims process as an
excellent study of gender differences in judging, among other things, formal data
analysis was never completed (the outcomes of the arbitration awards were con~
fidential). Nevertheless, in many informal meetings of the arbitrators and the
management of the program, gender differences in judging were revealed (not
always in a predictable direction). In some cases male judges were more likely to
grant higher amounts of damages (there was a monetary cap on all cases) because
they were moved by the pain and suffering they heard about; in other cases male
judges admitted an inability to assess the "female" pain of bleeding and reproduc~
rive organ pain and malfunction. In many cases women arbitrators had first~hand
knowledge and experience of the symptoms and injuries and thus could both
empathize with, but also discount, the claims made by injured claimants. Though
we have no formal data on outcome differentials, it was clear to us that there were
some (in both directions of harshness and generosity of awards, even within a
relatively small range of awards within the cap). Nevertheless, during the hear~
ings and afterward, I, and many of the other women arbitrators, received tearful
acknowledgments and letters of gratitude for the processes we had presided over
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with care (providing tissues, among other things), and for providing some relief
to the claimants who had to testify about intimate "female" problems and their
sexual history to a female, rather than male, judge.
This is not to say that some male arbitrators did not also provide fair and caring processes (as some of the males responding to Gilligan's Porcupine Dilemma
did), but my own experience in the Dalkon Shield hearings confirms what much
of the empirical data on judging is now suggesting: the gender of judges may matter if the issue being decided is gender salient. What is gender salient (biological concerns, family issues, discrimination claims) of course remains highly contested. Here it is important to note several different issues-where a contested
issue in a case does involve gender, there may be gender differentials (and those
gender differentials can operate in contradictory directions, such as more harsh
or lenient treatment of female criminal offenders, less credibility attached to particular kinds of claims and injuries) in outcomes. This is consistent with some
of the findings of studies of individual judges and justices such as Sandra Day
O'Connor and Baroness Brenda Hale, on the highest courts of the United States
and United Kingdom. 53 Second, gender behavior in the court or hearing room
(judicial temperament, process, rulings on what is relevant, salient, admissible)
may be "different;' irrespective of final outcome. To the extent that we know from
the literature of procedural justice that process matters for participants' valuation
of legal processes,H the way judges behave during the hearing may be extremely
important to claimants and participants in legal processes, irrespective (or unrelated to separate assessment) of outcomes. Thus, the role of gender in judicial
processes is complex.
While many have argued that because judging requires "neutrality" there will
be little evidence of difference in either process or outcome, several legal scholars have suggested a variety of characteristics that women judges might bring to
the bench, including compassion, a broader sense of relevance and admissibility,
patience, a greater sense of"connection" to the litigants, a broader sense of context, more generous conclusions about credibility (especially in cases of pain and
suffering), more attention to storytelling and narrative than crisper, leaner, more
legalistic testimonial evidence, and more sympathy for particular kinds of claimants (the helpless, children, other oppressed or subordinated people).55 Imagine
how the descriptions of the "rational" judge of Ronald Dworkin's Hercules 56
would have to be broadened to include some of these characteristics. While many
descriptions of appropriate judicial characteristics include such abstractions as
detachment, impartiality, disengagement, neutrality, independence, discernment,
analytic ability, strength, clarity, decisiveness, freedom from bias, open-mindedness, and commitment to equal justiceP those arguing that women judges will
bring more of their 'gendered" experiences, in both personal and professional
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roles, to the bench suggest that other and appropriate characteristics should be
added to any description of judging, including the values of compassion, Portia's
empathy and mercy, connection to (not disengagement from) litigants, courtesy,
sensitivity, and a deeper sense of context. Such authors (and I am among them)
have argued that to add these qualities ofjudging is not to challenge or change the
values of neutrality and lack of bias-indeed, they add to the justice and fairness
of decision making by adding human and appropriately affective (emotional) 58
considerations to what are not always totally rational or rule-flaw-based decisions. Thus, while often protesting that women will not "do justice" differently,
many commentators still argue for representativeness of judicial bodies, suggesting that in order to represent all the values that make up 'Just" decisions, women
(as well as other underrepresented groups) should be on the bench to reflect the
full range of values that exist in a society that defines justice demo~ratically.
Several literary and cultural sources provide stark representations of these
empirical findings and arguments (if not through rigorous social science). In
Susan Glaspell's famous play and short story, A Jury of Her Peers, 59 the wives of
the legal investigators and prosecutors of a murder of a local farmer in a remote
region of the Midwest consider "evidence" of the crime that is outside the "view"
or literal understanding of the male professionals. While the men look at conventional sources of proof for determining who committed the murder, the wives
discover that the wife of the farmer (the main suspect) has had her pet bird's
neck broken, cruelly. They infer from this "evidence" that she has been the subject of her husband's brutality and probably killed in "self-defense:' They, without words, 'Judge" her nonguilty by virtue of excuse or justification and quietly
remove the evidence their legalistic and conventional husbands could neither "see'
nor interpret properly. This story illustrates what has been called by feminist analysts a "women's way of knowing -deeply contextual thinking, looking at facts
or 'evidence" that would not necessarily or conventionally be considered legal, and
understanding motivations and facts that might not be formally considered relevant. The women in this story act as judge and jury and "acquit" their "fellow" wife
from a place of empathetic understanding of what and how hard her life was.
This story evokes complex reactions. To those who think the wives have "violated"
formal law by collaborating in the destruction of evidence, they are "lawless:' To a
large number of commentators, they are performing a higher justice (especially in
an era when women could not serve as actual judges or jurors) in considering the
facts outside the murder scene and seeing the wifes action in the context of her
life of terrible suffering. Glaspell based her play and story on a real case, which
she covered as a journalist, and she has been read as criticizing the formality and
limitedness of conventional (male) legal systems, which, with their formal and
narrow rules, do not do justice.
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More recently, the film Frozen Rive,-6° demonstrated a similar "womens justice"
on the u.S.-Canadian border as two women, one Native and the other Anglo~
White, become reluctant partners in an unlawful human smuggling operation
across the border. They know that what they are doing is unlawful, but both of
them are working to make money to provide for their children-a home for the
white children and an attempt to regain custody of her lost child for the Native
woman. In the course of their work they discover they have almost killed an inno~
cent baby belonging to one of their smugglees and they return at great danger to
themselves to rescue and resuscitate the baby. (Many viewers of the film in the
commercial theater at which I viewed it openly discussed whether male human
traffickers would have done the same!) Eventually, despite their initial distrust of
each other, these women care for each other and each other's children. The white
woman (Ray Eddy) helps the ~ative Woman (Lila) recapture her own child and
then Lila becomes the caretaker for all their children as Ray Eddy takes the "rap"
for their activities and is incarcerated. The film is a searing look at one of the
least~known sites of border crossings (the Mohawk region on the New York~
Quebec border) and its brutal honesty and frigid landscape all the more dramati~
cally reveal the little bit of human warmth provided by the female characters as
they attempt to raise their families alone and facilitate the desire of illegal border
crossers to find a better life.
True, another recent film about immigration, The Visitor,61 depicts the grow~
ing human connections between a male widower college professor, Walter Vale,
and the Syrian and Senegalese immigrants who are squatting in his New York
apartment. But this film also demonstrates the futility of individual stories and
narratives to achieve immigration justice in'the period of post~9/I1 immigration
rules and practices. In this film the connections are ultimately severed as Tarek
(the young Syrian musician) is deported back to Syria, separating him from his
girlfriend, his mother (Mouna, who lives in the Midwest,) and Professor Vale.
All are helpless at changing the legal turns of events and Tarde's mother (yet
another female heroine marked by her connection to family) returns (at great
risk to herself) to Syria to be with her son, sacrificing many things, including a
budding romance with the now rehumanized professor, who, perhaps because he
is so law~abiding and timid, is less efficacious than the "lawless" women of Frozen
River. In juxtaposition these films demonstrate how a man (Professor Vale), slav~
ishly following the law and passively obeying it, may do greater injustice (at a
deeper moral, not legal, level) than women (Lila and Ray Eddy), challenging the
law and living as "outlaws" on the "edge" of countries and lives.
Certainly, these are only fictional, if powerful depictions of the modern world
of immigration, from both sides of legality and lawless borders/2 but the film~
maker storytellers, like asylum applicants, are trying to demonstrate the indi~
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vidual pain and suffering that occurs with vague and harsh rules and arbitrary
and often brutal enforcement, and in their different ways, they also appeal to our
emotional and human, as well as legal, sense of (in)justice.
Thus, in a system ofjudging asylum claims that requires claimants to tell their
stories of persecution, harm, and suffering and not only to satisfy the statutory
standards but also to persuade a judge that a particular case has merit, both for
the individual and for the political issues implicated in refugee law, it should not
be surprising that emotional appeals, good storytelling, affidavits, and narratives
from family members and others who have been persecuted might draw greater
responsiveness from (at least some) women judges, especially those who have
worked within the immigration legal system.
The findings of this study are consistent with my claims of twenty-five years
ago that women judges might encourage more participatory, less adversarial-like,
more "conversation-like" proceedings within formal evidence rules and, therefore,
might be more likely to elicit a stronger, longer, and more detailed narrative from
a traumatized asylum claimant.63
Finally, as both quantitative and more qualitative studies of gender judicial
behavior demonstrate, women judges themselves have suffered disproportionately
from discrimination 64 (at work and in other aspects of their lives) and thus may
be more inclined to believe (credibility assessments) and empathize with asylum
claimants. Perhaps, at least for some, this experience of discrimination permits
them, literally, to "hear" better the "different" voices in their courtrooms, including
the literally hundreds of different languages represented in asylum hearings.
The particular findings of gender differentials in asylum grant rates here do
continue to raise some interesting, and as yet unstudied, questions, calling for
more research. First, and most importantly here, how do these judges describe
their own judicial behavior? How would both male and female immigration
judges react or respond to the findings here? Would they be surprised? Would
they offer illustrations of their own motivations or explanations about why they
might differ in their rulings from each other by gender? Second, are asylum cases
gender salient as I have described that concept here-does freedom from persecution, connection to family members, or other aspects of this claim make it more
like a discrimination, subordination, or family claim than other kinds of cases in
which there appear to be little or no gender disparities in outcomes?
The gendered nature of asylum claims has been most pronounced in a variety of contested cases involving genital mutilation65 and domestic violence66 as
"persecutions" on the basis of membership in a "social or political" group, that of
persecuted women, not yet recognized by most courts as a qualifying category.
And, to measure another possible influence of gender, it would be interesting to
compare grant and denial rates by gender of the asylum applicant (and to look at
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interactions of the gender of the applicant and the judge).67 Unfortunately, such
data were not provided in the current study.
Third, can we test empirically some of the claims I have made here about more
inclusive evidence, more conversational, less adversarial hearings-both the existence of these possibly differential processes and their effects? (Not likely, given
the lack of transcripts in most cases, especially those that are not appealed.)
Fourth, how should we account for the fact that asylum cases call for binary
(yes or no) decisions? This is not an environment in which, like Amy, we can
search to meet the needs of all the parties. Either asylum is granted or it is notno negotiation, mediated process, or intermediate outcome is permitted under
the rules. Are women more likely to resolve a doubt or use a different standard
of proof if the evidence is not totally clear on one side in favor of granting asylum while male judges exercise their blunt cuts more often in the other direction?
Does the gender disparity in outcomes hold true for other kinds of immigration
claims (removal, etc.)?
Finally, what might the consequences be for the asylum judicial system of
knowledge of these findings? How will represented claimants try to "game" the
system to be assigned to female judges, despite the clerk's random assignments?
How will unrepresented claimants fare in an environment where experienced or
well-educated lawyers know of these results but unrepresented parties will not?
(Badly, we can assume, since their grant rates are already much lower than those
who have counsel [45.6% of those who are represented are successful in seeking
asylum, compared to 16.3 % who do not have counselJ.}All of these unanswered
questions call for more research and make the policy implications of the present
study difficult to assess.

E. Policy Implications of the "Gender Gap" in Asylum Judging
Though the findings are clear, strong, and relatively robust (even when tested
against and combined with other important variables) that women immigration
judges are much more likely to grant asylum than their male colleagues, what
we should do about these findings is much less clear. The danger, of course, is
that such findings will be used to proclaim women judges too "soft" or "lenient" in
an era of immigration phobia, especially after September II, 2001, has hardened
our immigration policies and, in principle, if not in actuality, hardened our borders. This could cause a serious backlash against women judges, both in appointing them and in monitoring their behavior. Even worse, those already serving as
immigration judges might see these results and decide to "overcompensate" by
increasing denial rates'to prove their even-handedness and neutrality. Worse yet,
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these findings could "infect" judicial appointments generally, not just to the immi~
gration courts, by providing fodder for those who want to argue about women
judges being too "soft:'
On the other hand, we could look at what makes women judges more likely
to grant asylum as a sign that our system needs redirection. Perhaps the "ethic
of justice" (and rules and formality) should, in Portia's words, "be tempered
with mercy:' Perhaps women judges encourage more respectful courtrooms
with active listening that allows traumatized victims of persecution to tell a
more complete and accurate story. Perhaps a little compassion is appropriate in
a potentially life~ending judicial proceeding. We know we cannot admit every~
one who wants to come to the United States, but do we know what an "opti~
mal" or "appropriate" number of refugees is, given both world conditions and
our capacity to offer safety and shelter to those who need it from outside of
our well~constructed "hole" of warmth in winter? Perhaps two sorts of heads
and hearts (both male and female) can give us better answers when they work
additively and together.
Like the principal authors of this book, I do not think we should deal with
gender disparities by issuing quotas or numbers for immigration judges to mea~
sure themselves against. I do think we should pay some attention to who our
immigration judges are and how they are selected, trained, and evaluated. 68 Most
state and federal judges are accountable, in some cases by election, in others by
appellate review or publication of decisions, opinions, and reversal rates. Just
learning what we have from this study should demonstrate the importance of see~
ing and understanding those "social facts" that we learn from statistical analysisthe patterns in the aggregate that are often not readily apparent to the "naked"
human eye. Clearly we need to study more the why and the how of the differences
in gender judging in immigration.
In the meantime, however, I would suggest that we reorder what we think the
"norm" ought to be. Perhaps in a world that is brutish and getting ever "smaller"
and at the same time continues to have its share of cruelty, we might consider
how appropriate it might be in a system of refugee protection to consider other
factors and different processes-including more inclusive, less formal hearings,
consideration of family connections and emotions, and a generous benefit of
the doubt in credibility determinations, rather than overly harsh cross~exami~
nations-for those who have usually undergone enormous hardship just to get
here and make an asylum claim in the first place.69 Perhaps the processes that
produced a high~r grant rate for women judges should be the processes and
decision rules for alL Perhaps asylum in a '({ifferent" voice might be asylum in a
"better" voice as well.
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